Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 2 Volume 25, Issue 2-3 (2013)

Article 2

2013

The Significance of the Distinction Between
Children and Adults for Consumer Protection
M. Neil Browne
Senior Scholar, Prof. of Economics, Bowling Green State University

Lauren Biksacky

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
M. N. Browne & Lauren Biksacky The Significance of the Distinction Between Children and Adults for Consumer Protection, 25 Loy.
Consumer L. Rev. 185 (2013).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol25/iss2/2

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Browne ArticleFinal (Do Not Delete)

3/11/2013 5:15 PM

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CHILDREN
AND ADULTS FOR CONSUMER
PROTECTION
M. Neil Browne *
Lauren Biksacky **
“I long remained a child, and I am still one in many
respects.” – Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Confessions

I. INTRODUCTION

D

uring 2009, at least 114 million U.S. consumers regularly
purchased dietary supplements. 1 Almost all scientific
evidence indicates that dietary supplements are not effective in
helping people lose weight. 2 Despite the scientific evidence
contradicting the efficacy of dietary supplements, 62.9 percent of
dietary supplement users and 42.8 percent of dietary supplement
non-users indicated in a National Obesity Study that they
perceived dietary supplements as an effective method of weight
loss. 3 Meaning, substantial proportions of American adult
consumers have gross misconceptions about the safety, efficacy,

* Senior Scholar and Distinguished Teaching Professor of Economics, Bowling
Green State University
**Lauren Biksacky, Yale Law School
1
See Natasha Singer, Study Urges More Oversight of Dietary Items, N.Y.
Times,
(Mar.4,2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/04/business/04diet.html?ref=dietarysuppleme
ntsandherbalremedies&_r=0.on.
2
See Janine L. Pillitteri et al., Use of Dietary Supplements for Weight
Loss in the United States: Results of a National Survey, 16 OBESITY 790, 790
(2008).
3
Id. at 794.
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and regulation of dietary supplements. 4 Despite the hazards and
ineffectiveness of dietary supplements, consumers continue to be
beguiled by the marketing claims of these products.
Would children behave less skillfully as consumers? The
question is stark and hyperbolic. They would, but how legally
significant is the difference?
American culture and its derivative jurisprudential habits
place a strong emphasis on individualism and personal
responsibility. 5 But the expectation of personal responsibility does
not extend to children. Rather, children are considered vulnerable
and in need of protection, while adults are assumed to be rational
and autonomous.
But when we think about fairness in the marketplace and
the allocation of responsibility for the quality of consumer
decisions, should the distinction between child and adult have
major legal implications? Is the social distinction between
children and adults in fact properly conceptualized as being on a
continuum? Specifically, should adult consumers be presumed
autonomous and self-sufficient in their market exchanges, or do
they, like children, have moments of vulnerability requiring legal
protection?
The assumption that adults are autonomous and rational
holds major significance for our attitudes toward legal regulation
of business. When we assume that adult consumers: (1) are able
educate themselves about the numerous products on the market
and choose the ones that best fit their needs, (2) are able to sort
the puffing from the substance in promotional appeals from
alternative sellers, and (3) possess the time to make the
calculations that would best guarantee their health and safety
when they choose a good or service, it follows that social norms in
the marketplace yield efficiency and fairness. 6 Such a perspective
Id. at 790.
See M. Neil Browne & Michael D. Meuti, Individualism and the Market
Determination of Women’s Wages in the United States, Canada, and Hong
Kong, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 355, 357-372 (1999); Nancy Kubasek et
al., It Takes an Entire Village to Protect an Endangered Species:
Individualism, Overlapping Spheres, and the Endangered Species Act, 10
FORDHAM ENVT’L. LAW J. 155, 157-161 (1999); Carlos A. Ball,
Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 448 (2000).
6
Richard A. Epstein, Lawyers’ Rise or Fall?, NAT’L L.J., May 31, 2004, at
27 (arguing that “most routine disputes about the practice of law don’t call for
legal intervention precisely because the wide range of low-level social
sanctions works remarkably well to keep people in line”). In other words, legal
4
5
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emphasizes both the desirability and the reasonableness of
minimizing legal “interference” in the daily affairs of contracting
agents. However, many behavioral studies suggest that
consumers are often not rational decision makers as assumed by
classical economic theory, but are instead vulnerable and easily
influenced. If such research is correct, the power imbalance in
negotiations over price and quality in markets cries out for a
remedy in those market instances where the three assumptions
discussed above are merely wishful thinking. A remedy will only
be created if consumers are looked at in a different light.
A productive metaphor for thinking about relationships
and tensions in the millions of decisions made each day in
assorted markets is the distinction between that stage of life we
refer to as “childhood” and the later stage we call “adulthood.”
Even those of us who are the most vigilant guardians of the
economic freedom of business entities do not feel comfortable
when brilliant marketing campaigns are directed at children.
Children are highly vulnerable to manipulation by others, and we
acknowledge that heightened vulnerability. Indeed, if all
consumers were small children, the extent of regulation that
democracies would expect from their governments would boggle
our minds in its expansiveness. Children bring out our
compassionate and sensitive sides; we want to protect them.
However, in individualistic cultures like the United
States, 7 we change our attitudes toward the “terms of the trade”
intervention on behalf of consumers in markets is a costly waste of time
inconsistent with the value of efficiency. However, even Professor Epstein, a
persistent critic of the legal regulation of business recognizes that norms are
only useful in particular contexts. In the spirit of this article, he realizes that
each market operates in a context of more or less openness and accessibility to
consumer needs: “The success of these sanctions, however, varies inversely
with the size of the target group. In small communities and businesses,
individuals are constantly under the watchful eye of family and friends; any
small deviation from some deeply held social norm is likely to prompt a
pointed response.” But cf. Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic
Ignorance, Heuristics, And The Use Of Norms As Private Regulation, 57 ALA.
L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2005) (arguing that social norms do not provide the promised
ethical protection to the general public because of various habitual cognitive
errors that distort social judgment about organizational behavior).
7
See ROBERT N. BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 23 (1985) [hereinafter,
BELLAH 1985]. Freedom is often defined as the freedom from an oppressive
authority and from having others views and lifestyles forced upon them. What
it is that one might do with that freedom is much more difficult for Americans
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or the “results of the bargain” once we see the parties involved as
“adults.” 8 Then, except in exceptional cases, we expect the
individual to watch out for his or her own interests in market
transactions, to behave, as we say, “like an adult.” For example,
American courts have been very hesitant to rush to consumers’
defense when the consumers claim that they bought a good or
service only because the seller concealed information about its
attributes. 9 It is difficult to imagine similar rulings had the judges
to define. See also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, as
excerpted in ROBERT N. BELLAH, ET AL. EDS., INDIVIDUALISM &
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 11 (1987) [hereinafter, BELLAH, 1987]
(“‘Individualism’ is a word recently coined to express a new idea. Our fathers
knew only about egoism. Egoism is a passionate and exaggerated love of self
which leads a man to think of all things in terms of himself and to prefer
himself to all. Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which disposes
each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into
the circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he
gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself. Egosim springs from a
blind instinct; individualism is based on misguided judgment rather than
depraved feeling. It is due more to inadequate understanding than to
perversity of heart. Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every virtue; individualism at
first only dams the spring of publick virtues, but in the long run it attacks and
destroys all the others too and finally merges in egoism. Egoism is a vice as old
as the world. It is not peculiar to one form of society more than another.
Individualism is of democratic origin and threatens to grow as conditions get
more equal.”); Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, et al., Advancing the Rights of Poor
and Working-Class Women in an Individualistic Culture, 2 LOY. POVERTY L.
J. 41, n.2 (1996) (holding that the only purpose of society is to benefit the
individual, atomism places a high value on negative liberty (the absence of
government interference in the lives of its citizens); E.K. HUNT, PROPERTY
AND PROPHETS: THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND IDEAS
39-40 (7th ed. 1995) (influence remains evident in the market-oriented thought
of neoclassical economists today); HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM &
COLLECTIVISM 2 (1995). Defining individualism as “a social pattern that
consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent of
collectives; are primarily motivated by their own preferences, rights, and the
contracts they have established with others; give priority to personal goals over
the goals of others; and emphasize rational analyses of the advantages and
disadvantages to associating with others”).
8
See, e.g., Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine
Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 47 (2012) (discussing how U.S. law
protects minors from engaging in contracts under a traditional “infancy
defense” due to their youth and assumed lack of understanding). Under this
doctrine, minors’ contracts are generally voidable. This defense is not
available to adults due to the sheer fact of age alone.
9
See M. Neil Browne, Justin Rex, & Curtis Bunner, Concealment of
Information in Consumer Transactions, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 270, 274
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been thinking of the prospective buyers as children.
The logic of this paper is as simple as it is important. The
first part presents a brief review of the traditional bases for
opposition to consumer protection. This cursory treatment has
the purpose of highlighting the extent to which oppositional
arguments rely implicitly on the distinction between a child and
an adult. The following section enumerates the specific
constitutive attitudes and behaviors of a child. These attributes
suggest heightened vulnerability to what can be an unforgiving
world. They need collective support to enable human flourishing,
and this need is broadly recognized.
Before examining the extent to which adults differ in their
cognitive habits from children, the third section explains the
assumptions that are made about the mental acuity of those who
negotiate price and quantity decisions in markets. The
“consumer” reflected in this portrayal is far from childlike. This
section is a necessary prelude to thinking deeply about adult
cognitive tendencies because those market assumptions need to
be realized in human agents if the beneficent effects of private
supply and demand interactions are to prevail. The key to this
section’s importance is the discussion of what we know about
adulthood in terms of the quality ofdecision-making of the typical
adult. While it would make little sense to claim that there are no
differences at all between a representative 10 year-old and a
typical 45 year-old, the evidence we have from many scientific
sources suggests that older humans tend to exaggerate their
relative prowess to some degree. 10 Accepting a more accurate
portrayal of who “adults” are creates a more thoughtful
foundation for weighing the costs and benefits of consumer
protection.

II. STANDARD ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONSUMER
PROTECTION
In the United States, resistance to the regulation of
business practices stems from the argument that businesses are
private entities that should operate under the “invisible economic
hand,” not under the control of the government. 11 More
(2008).
10
11

See infra Section II.
See Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political
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specifically, advocates of free market systems and deregulation of
businesses assert that the “invisible economic hand” leads to
growth and prosperity, 12 and transactions that are best for both
businesses and consumers. 13
The reasoning behind the argument against regulation of
business practices relies on several descriptive assumptions.
Primarily, proponents against regulation of businesses make
several assumptions about the cognitive abilities of consumers;
consumers are assumed to be rational calculators, who have
fixed, predetermined preferences between and among all
available goods and services, and thus, have the ability to make
choices that maximize their self-interested preferences. 14
Consumers are assumed to have the ability to weigh the costs and
benefits of a purchase, and behave in a manner that maximizes
his or her best interest. 15 According to those who advocate
“getting the heavy burden of government off of the backs of
business”, consumers are rational calculators capable of making
purchasing decisions in their best interest. 16 Therefore, despite the
profit motivations of sellers, regulation of the business firm is an
unnecessary and costly attempt to guide consumer purchases – an
unwarranted coercion of consumers. Under the assumption that
consumers are rational actors, it would follow that consumers
should be granted autonomous decision-making privileges, or,
“consumer sovereignty,” 17 because they can take care of
themselves.
If we assume that consumers are rational actors and “selfinterest maximizers,” then not only is business regulation an
Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization
Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 637 (2010).
12
Id.
13
See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law,
the Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147, 1197 (2010).
14
See Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 13839 (2009).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See Ronald Chen and Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The
Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 83-84 (2004). Stating that consumers
“know
their
preferences,
institutions should therefore defer to their choices. This concept of consumer
sovereignty is implicit, if not explicit, in most U.S. laws and policies, including
corporate law.”
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impediment on consumer sovereignty, but business regulation is
also an unwarranted imposition on the internal structure of the
business firm.18 Business regulations require spending money on
measures of compliance, and thus, spending money on massive
changes that alter the financial and structural make-up of the
business firm. 19 In short, advocates against business regulation
are often reacting to what is perceived to be an unwarranted
financial and structural burden.
If we reread the argument about the wisdom of
deregulation and opposition to prospective regulations of seller
conduct from a different perspective, the argument sounds hollow
and lacking in empathy. Suppose we conceive of adult consumers
as overwhelmed by the scope of skills and the amount of time
required for them to protect themselves in a struggle where they
are frequently out of their league in terms of knowledge of
chemistry, nutrition, health effects, and the persuasive use of
psychology by marketers, as well as being comparatively
mismatched in terms of the time they can realistically be expected
to devote to making wise consumer decisions. In other words,
notice how draconian those assumptions sound when used as
descriptive of expectations placed on vulnerable consumers.

III. CHILDREN VS. ADULTS
A. Childhood: For Better or Worse
If we are to consider adults as vulnerable in the
marketplace, a good place to start in appreciating that
vulnerability is to focus on the attributes of a child because
children are clearly in need of guidance from empathetic parents
and a nurturing community. Defining the traits and expectations
for a “child” versus an “adult” is dependent on culture. 20
18
See Edward Rubin, The Regulatizing Process and the Boundaries of
New Public Governance, WIS. L. REV. 535, 547 (2010).
19
Id. at 547.
20
See Sigal Benporath, Autonomy and Vulnerability: On Just Relations
between Adults and Children, 37 J. PHIL. EDUC. 127, 129 (2003) (“Childhood as
a state and as having a particular social status evolved through the
endorsement of laws and treaties protecting children from physical abuse,
neglect, work at a young age, premature marriage, and other previously
unquestioned social norms. . .The particular Western conception of childhood,
sometimes taken for granted by people in developed countries today, does not
apply outside this specific geo-historical context.”); Michael Shanahan,
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However, the definition of “child” does have certain
unchangeable aspects because it is a biological classification
related to immaturity and a period of physical, mental, and
emotional development. 21 Generally, children are educated to
acquire the knowledge and skills they will need as adults. 22
Children are also assumed to require extra protection and
guidance since they are vulnerable relative to older individuals.23
Some philosophies consider childhood in positive terms as
a time of growth and change. Yet other philosophies regard
childhood as a state of incompleteness, a liability because it is a
condition partly defined by dependence. For example, under
Kantian philosophy adults are labeled autonomous, while
children are characterized by their need for paternalistic control. 24
Kantian scholar Tamar Schapiro suggests that “To treat someone
like a child is, roughly, to treat her as if her life is not quite her
own to lead and as if her choices are not quite her own to
make.” 25
Pathways to Adulthood in Changing Societies: Variability and Mechanisms in
Life Course Perspective, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 667, 667 (2000). See also, Sarah
Hayford & Frank Furstenberg, Is 30 the New 20? Trends in Age Distribution
of Problem Behaviors in Young Adulthood 1-2, 12 (January 2005) (Paper
Presented at American Sociological Association Conference), available at
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/2/2/2/2/p2
2229_index.html?phpsessid=81e99e59b11a765ec823e9eb9143ddbb (discussing
that, since the Baby Boom generation, adults have been attaining a higher
level of education, getting married and having children later, and waiting
longer after marriage to have a first child. They are also more likely now than
in previous generations to live with their parents again after being independent
for a period of time, and they are more likely to return to school after working
for a number of years).
21
See David Kennedy, Reconstructing Childhood, 14 THINKING 29
(1998).
22
See Louise Friquegnon, What is a Child?, 13 THINKING 12 (1997) (“The
concept of childhood is a normative concept because it involves preparation
for adult life, acquiring information, skills, and self-control, and forming
preferences, priorities and goals, in accordance with socially shared
standards”).
23
Kennedy, supra note 21.
24
See Tamar Schapiro, What is a Child?, 109 ETHICS 715, 716 (1999)
(“These special obligations to children include duties to protect, nurture,
discipline and educate them. They are paternalistic in nature because we feel
bound to fulfill them regardless of whether the children in question consent to
be protected, nurtured, disciplined, and educated. Indeed we think of children
as people who have to be educated whether they like it or not”).
25
Id. at 715 (“It is in virtue of children’s undeveloped condition that we
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Kantian
philosophy
privileges
autonomy
and
independence. Adults are considered autonomous because they
have formed perspectives and opinions they use to conduct their
lives. 26 As Schapiro states, “an adult. . .is one who is in a position
to speak her own voice, the voice of one who stands in a
determinate, authoritative relation to the various motivational
forces inside her.” 27 Meaning, an adult has a value structure and
an understanding of her preferences that guides her decisions. 28
In contrast, Schapiro suggests that a child cannot be
autonomous because her voice is still developing, so “there is no
voice which counts as hers.” 29 Since children lack social
experience, their words and actions have less “weight” than those
of adults. 30 Further, because children cannot fully consider the
social implications of their actions, we do not hold them
responsible for those actions in the same way we hold adults
responsible.31
B. Child/Adult Continuum
Conversely, Frances Waksler argues that the divisions
between adulthood and childhood are flimsy at best, stating,
“Perhaps adulthood is at heart a tenuous achievement, being
adult a continuous accomplishment, and the serious questioning
of adult understandings thus a challenge to a fragile view of the
feel we have special obligations to them, obligations which are of a more
paternalistic nature than are our obligations to other adults”).
26
Id. at 729.
27
Id. at 729-30 (suggesting that adults have a framework for making
decisions, but she also states adults should not be expected to have an
immediate answer to all questions; an adult may need time to consider how the
question and her answer fit into her values framework).
28
Id. at 729.
29
Id. at 729. Contra Benporath, supra note 20, at 132 (“A child should be
accepted for what she is now, and not regarded as lacking by comparison to
others.”); Kennedy, supra note 20, at 34 (suggesting that our perceptions of
children and childhood are often “adultcentric,” favoring adult perspectives).
30
See Schapiro, supra note 24, at 716 (“The consent or dissent of a child
does not have the same authority and moral significance as the consent or
dissent of an adult”).
31
See Schapiro, supra note 24, at 717. Contra Benporath, supra note 20, at
136 (arguing that adults who are exposed to new countries, languages, and
cultures need as much help and guidance as children; suggesting these adults,
like children, should not be held fully responsible for their actions because they
are also learning cultural norms).
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world. . . Much of adult knowledge is based on faith—faith in the
correctness of what people were taught as children.” 32
“Child” and “adult” are not dichotomous terms, but are
instead at opposite ends of a continuum. As Sigal Benporath
suggests, we need to “[Realize] the flexibility of the concept of
childhood. . . There is no specific point in the process of
development that turns children into adults.” 33 He reasons that
humans are continuously weaving between states of autonomy
and dependence, and while children and adults may not be very
different, children “have unique traits that must be considered by
the relevant public institutions.” 34 For example, governments
must decide at what age individuals are generally mature enough
to vote, get a driver’s license, and be legally responsible for their
welfare. Yet Benporath cautions that individual responsibility is
not dependent on age: “All of these somewhat arbitrary
judgments are based on statistical assumptions that people of a
specific age can indeed be expected to drive carefully, decide
autonomously on their sexual conduct, or be sufficiently morally
developed.” 35 Simply living until the age of twenty-one does not
guarantee that an individual has reached a certain level of
emotional and intellectual maturity. Given this variability in
human development, it also stands to reason that traits we
generally ascribe to either adults or children are not exclusive to
one or the other group, but tend to vary from individual to
individual.
1. Emotional Control
One marker of adulthood is supposed to be the ability to
control emotions. Thus, were children to be unprotected in the
marketplace, they could be easily manipulated to purchase goods
32
FRANCES CHAPUT WAKSLER, STUDYING THE SOCIAL WORLDS OF
CHILDREN: SOCIOLOGICAL READINGS 62 (1991).
33
See Benporath, supra note 20, at 131. See David Goode, Kids, Culture,
and Innocents, 9 HUMAN STUDIES 83, 87 (1986). Emphasizing the fluidity of
the labels “child” and “adult,” and how perceiving and acting the world as a
child or an adult is not dependent on age, but on culture and social groups.
Adults are not barred from seeing the world as children, just as “adultness
(perceiving and acting upon the world as an adult) is not guaranteed by virtue
of having matured biologically and is not something which is barred to
children.”
34
See Benporath, supra note 20, at 132.
35
Id.
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and services that are inconsistent with their needs but highly
consistent with the profits of the manipulators. Children are
generally less able than adults to suppress their feelings, as they
have not yet learned how to be calm in stressful situations or
when they do not get their way. This inability “[makes children]
more liable to behavioral ‘excess,’ whether in the form of ‘acting
out,’ or emotional upset.” 36 Many people have witnessed such
displays in the checkout aisle of grocery stories as harried parents
try to calm a screaming child demanding candy.
However, many adults are not immune from emotional
“excess.” Consider reports of road rage in which adult drivers
display extreme frustration towards other drivers, sometimes
leading to accidents or violence. 37 According to Bruce Sharkin,
“Driving behaviors such as tailgating, cutting someone off,
making obscene gestures, and flashing one’s headlights are
becoming more and more commonplace in everyday driving
situations,” 38 suggesting that a decent number of adults lack the
ability to control their emotions in certain situations.
2. Autonomous Decision-Making
We assume that because children do not have as much life
experience as adults, they require more guidance when making
decisions. We know that we cannot allow children to eat cookies
36
See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 33 (suggesting that adults feel many of
the same emotional impulses as children, but have disciplined themselves not
to act on these emotions: “In a culture balanced toward repression, the child is
the “wild body” par excellence. . .each of her instinctual expressions is living
reminder of the adult’s own repressed impulses”).
37
See Thomas Britt & Michael Garrity, Attributions and Personality as
Predictors as Predictors of Road Rage Response, 45 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
127, 128 (2006) (defining road rage as combination of thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors that an individual has in response to what she perceives as a
provocation when driving).
38
See Bruce Sharkin, Road Rage: Risk Factors, Assessment, and
Intervention Strategies, 82 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 191 (2004) (citing a report
by the American Automobile Association Foundation for Traffic Safety stating
that aggressive incidents on the road increased 50 percent from 1990 to 1996).
These incidents caused thousands of injuries and 200 deaths. Sharkin suggests
that, “Similar to other forms of aggression, aggressive driving is believed to
occur under conditions of anonymity, that is, when drivers are less visible to
other drivers.” Id. at 192. While drivers realize that their poor conduct is not
socially acceptable, they allow themselves to commit such acts if they think
their identity will not be known. Id.
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for dinner, watch too much television, or spend all their
allowance money. We must encourage them to eat vegetables and
read books, and open a savings account, since these choices will
benefit them in the future.
In American culture we also assume that adults should be
able to make all life decisions independently, and that these
decisions will be the correct ones for their circumstances. 39 Yet it
is difficult to make autonomous decisions without some level of
experience with the subject matter. Since life experience is a
variable quality, different adults will have had different
experiences. An adult who may feel competent making decisions
in one area of her life may feel less competent in another area and
require assistance to make an informed choice. 40
For example, just as children need help with decisionmaking to help them prepare for adult life, adults may need help
when entering new stages of life, such as deciding how to best to
care for aging parents. Adult children and their parents have not
been “socialized to optimally cope with the intergenerational
issues involved with increased longevity,” 41 and may require
assistance to negotiate shifting adult/child relationship
boundaries and make the best choices for themselves and their
parents.
This analysis has a direct link to consumer decisions. Each
new good or service we encounter as buyers presents a new,
previously unexplored challenge. What is the function of this
potential service? Is it safe and dependable? Is the price
reasonably related to the price of alternatives? To what extent
can I believe claims about the potential purchase made by those
motivated by a profit incentive? Even for products with which
we believe we have extensive experience, any alteration in an
element of the good or service requires a new set of consumer
calculations of costs and benefits.
3. Rational Nature
Rationality, defined here as the ability to make logical
decisions, is another variable quality in both adults and children.
For information on the inability of adults to make rational decisions, see
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
40
See Kennedy, supra note 21.
41
CLAIRE M. BRODY & VICKI G. SEMEL, STRATEGIES FOR THERAPY
WITH THE ELDERLY 88-89 (2nd ed. 2006).
39
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Most children are less rational than adults, but can be educated
how to think rationally. 42 Children’s intellectual abilities are in
large part dependent on the education and training they receive.
In turn, some adults argue that children must receive educational
interventions allowing them to develop the skills they need to
reflect critically on important decisions. 43 In other words,
addressing vulnerability does not require interfering with
autonomy, but rather can mean constructing the capacity to
pursue decisions consistent with a more reflective autonomy. As
Colin McLeod states, “Equipping children with robust
deliberative capacities will assist them, as they mature, in
identifying ends that are valuable and worth pursuing and in
discarding or revising ends that are insufficiently valuable.” 44
This theory can be applied to adults on a continuum who may
not think rationally in the market place.
4. Childhood and Adult Autonomy
Mika LaVaque-Manty states that according to Kant, “to
be an autonomous agent is to act on reasons you give yourself, as
opposed to being the vehicle for some other force” such as
someone else’s demands, or the instincts of one’s own body.45
Autonomy is a cherished value because it reflects respect for each
individual. The consumer role is just one of many where we hope
we can function effectively through self-reliance. In American
culture we assume that adults are autonomous and children are
not, so children must trust adults to provide them with an
See Benporath, supra note 20, at 131. Benporath quotes Locke as
stating that reason is “available to children as early as they understand
language,” and reason can develop into rationality if children “experience
favourable conditions.” At the same time, we must ask what happens to
children who do not experience favourable conditions in their education, and
how their decision-making abilities may be affected. See Colin McLeod,
Shaping Children’s Conviction, 1 THEORY & RES. IN EDUC. 315, 317 (2003).
43
See McLeod, supra note 42, at 318.
44
Id. at 321. McLeod promotes rational thinking for children, but admits
it has limits. His argument assumes “that the value we seek for our lives is
fairly translucent to reflective reasoning. . .that developed deliberative
capacities can track value reasonably well. To be sure, our capacities to track
value are imperfect. Even highly autonomous persons can make poor choices.
But we have a better chance of identifying errors and effecting revisions to our
like plans if we have developed powers of critical reflection.” Id.
45
See Mika LaVaque-Manty, Kant’s Children, 32 SOC. THEORY & PRAC.
365, 387 (2006).
42
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education that will prepare them for adulthood. Yet if not all
children receive the same level of education, they will enter
adulthood with different capacities. This variability creates a
logical problem: some children will be well-trained to enter the
marketplace as adults with established critical thinking skills,
while others will get older, but their additional years will do little
to reduce their vulnerability to those whose education and focus
equip them to sell buyers on the desirability of products and
services of questionable merit.
C. Autonomy vs. Paternalism
LaVaque-Monty asserts that measurements of autonomy
are difficult to make with any sense of accuracy: “The point isn’t
that there is some unequivocal fact of the matter about whether
someone really is or can be autonomous. Things always are, to
some extent, ambiguous. . .it’s an open question whether
autonomy in one dimension is reasonable grounds for ascribing
autonomy in another.” 46 While adults are generally more
autonomous than children, we cannot assume that most adults
will often make the best decisions for themselves. Adults have
variable personality traits, levels of education, and life
experiences, so it is difficult to know whether any given adult will
have the proper tools to deal with a particular problem.
Because children are considered more vulnerable than
adults, they have more protections under the law. 47 However,
Id. LaVaque-Monty emphasizes the social dimensions of autonomy,
stating that considering someone autonomous implies that she can think for
herself, and that other people agree she can think for herself: “I am
autonomous if someone ascribes self-authorization to me. My actual cognitive
ability to think may be a necessary condition for such an ascription, but it isn’t
a sufficient one. There is a complex interrelation between acquiring the
capacity for responsible agency and coming to be recognized (in one’s closer
and wider social environment) as capable of being responsible.” Id. at 369. If
we agree that one’s autonomy is dependent on social acceptance, it is possible
for an individual to be autonomous and not be recognized as such. For
example, women and people of color were denied autonomy for a long period
of time. Id. at 386. Conversely, an individual could be socially accepted as
autonomous and yet not able to make the best decisions for her or himself.
47
See Melvin Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 212-13 (1995). Eisenberg explains that the
enforcement of a contract with a child can be limited because of lack of
capacity, which “exists when a party is not competent to understand the nature
and consequences of his acts. . .he cannot make adequate judgments
46
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adults are not fully autonomous in all areas of life and do not
always have complete control over their environment, so they are
also in need certain protections.
In an individualistic culture, like America, some adults
consider any form of paternalistic regulation that defines what
they can and cannot do as an infringement on their right to make
autonomous decisions.48 While we agree that paternalism is fine
for children, such treatment for adults is vigorously opposed.
That attitude may be based on the child/adult dichotomy. We
accept the idea that a child needs a parent, but in an
individualistic culture, regulatory interventions in the decisions of
businesses are often reduced to the label of “paternalistic.” Here
the idea of a parent is transformed into a pejorative rhetorical
flourish.
However, Francis Schrag argues it is logically difficult to
justify paternalism for children and not adults since there is no
measurable trait that can distinguish children from adults. 49
Even though he fails to find such a difference, however, Schrag
argues we must support the idea of this difference as a “noble lie,”
so children do not harm themselves and adults do not become
subject to paternalism. 50 Schrag’s philosophy and aversion to
concerning his utility. . .” Id. Eisenberg further argues that because adults also
have cognitional limits, they should have more protections under contract law.
Id. at 212.
48
See Francis Schrag, The Child in the Moral Order, 52 PHIL. 167, 169
(1977). See id. at 171 (“We adults are likely to recoil at the suggestion that
others might be better placed than we, ourselves, to make decisions regarding
our welfare. But why do we not recoil from the idea that we are so placed
with regard to our children’s welfare?”). See generally Friedman, infra note
60, for his comments on the importance of free choice.
49
See Schrag, supra note 48, at 170-72. Schrag states that while people
assume an individual needs to be rational to be independent, the concept of
rationality is an abstract and inaccurate means of measuring who needs
paternalistic protection and who does not. Schrag further argues that selfsufficiency is also an inadequate means to determine who needs paternalistic
care, as there is no clear way to delineate the self-sufficient from those who are
not. For instance, some children may be able to earn enough money to care for
themselves, but they are not able to make the best decisions regarding their
welfare. Conversely, elderly or disabled people may not be able to earn enough
to support themselves, but they can make their own decisions. Id. at 173.
50
See Schrag, supra note 48, at 177. Schrag states that even though adults,
like children, may not be able to grasp the effects their actions will have in
twenty years’ time, adults should not be subject to paternalism. He states,
“What is troubling is the possibility. . .that most men might be generally misled
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paternalism for adults mirrors the ideals of an individualistic
society, in which respecting people means respecting their
individual choices. 51
The next question we must ask is: can an individual choice
be justified if it poses a risk to the individual or to other people?
Even Schrag admits that adults need some behavioral controls to
prevent injury, such as not being allowed to drive while
intoxicated or buy certain drugs without a prescription. Adults
cannot always be expected to do everything in their own best
interest or refrain from engaging in behaviors that might harm to
others. 52
Some paternalistic restrictions can be justified because
they are designed to protect the health and well-being of the
community. For instance, some states and cities prevent
restaurant patrons from smoking inside because it exposes other
diners to toxins. 53 We cannot protect ourselves from smoke in
restaurants, so we must have regulations to control those
behaviors.
Slightly more complicated and controversial are laws that
focus on preventing individuals from harming themselves, such
as restricting the kinds of food that can be sold in vending
machines. 54 Another example of this type of law are regulations
about the sources of their own happiness.” Id. Schrag further warns against a
society in which “adults become like children. . .can we not imagine farsighted
individuals able to recognize that much we do now is not merely injurious to
others and to future generations but shortsighted in just the same way—that in
twenty years we ourselves will profoundly regret the choices we have made,
choices, for example, in the areas of diet or resource conservation or family
planning.” Id. at 175. See contra Aharon Aviram, The Subjection of Children,
24 J. PHIL. EDUC. 213, 223 (1990). Aviram suggests that if Schrag believes
there is no real difference between adults and children, why would children
bring worse things on themselves than adults bring on themselves?
51
See Michael Neumann, Did Kant Respect Persons? 6 RES PUBLICA 285,
293-94 (2000) (“To respect an individual is to let that person go his own way,
whether we approve of it or not, as long as he doesn’t injure others”).
52
See Schrag, supra note 48, at 177.
53
See J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 L. PHIL. 393, 394
(2005). Trout argues certain regulations should be imposed by the government
to counteract our natural inclinations toward cognitive biases. He suggests
these biases impede our thinking and hamper the achievement of our true
goals: “Regulation can be permissible even when it runs counter to that
person’s spontaneous wishes, particularly when the regulation advances the
agent’s considered judgments or implicit long-term goals.” Id.
54
See Ministry of Labour and Citizens’ Services, Healthier Choices in
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that require motorcyclists to wear helmets to lessen the chance of
a traumatic head injury if the rider is involved in an accident.
Some decry these regulations as limiting personal choice. Fortyseven states used to have mandatory helmet laws, but during the
past three decades many have been repealed. Now only twenty
states have mandatory helmet laws, and twenty-seven states have
helmet laws for minors. 55 Many of these state laws were repealed
because of the efforts of motorcycle enthusiasts who argued
helmet laws infringed on their rights.56 Alternatively in some
states, the courts ruled helmet laws were not only designed to
protect the motorcyclists, but to protect society from paying for
the care of injured motorcyclists. 57 Many arguments regarding
Vending Machines in B.C. Public Buildings: Policy Paper, May 25, 2007,
available
at:
http://www.lcs.gov.bc.ca/HealthierChoices/pdf/CompletePolicy.pdf.
British
Columbia’s provincial government has enacted a province-wide policy to
replace junk food with healthy food in vending machines in public buildings.
The government’s objective is to encourage markets for healthier foods, and
“promote an environment that encourages healthier eating in line with the goal
of reducing health care costs by promoting individual health.” Id. Food is
classified into four categories—choose most, choose sometimes, choose least,
and not recommended—based on the amount of sugar, salt, fat, and fiber
relative to the number of calories. Vending machines in public buildings
cannot sell foods in the “not recommended” or “choose least” categories. See
Rob Moodie, Boyd Swinburn, Jeff Richardson, Bertino Somaini, Childhood
Obesity – A Sign of Commercial Success, but a Market Failure, 1 INT. J.
PEDIATRIC OBESITY, 133, 136 (2006). Moodie and his colleagues argue that
those who overeat may need protections because they do not know or have a
difficult time achieving what is best for their welfare: “People may not have
the correct information, nor the analytical ability, strength of character, or will
to convert what they know to be best for themselves or their children into
effective action.” Id. Also, Moodie and his colleagues suggest those who have a
long-term goal to eat healthily might weaken in the short term and seek
immediate gratification in the form of junk food. Id.
55
See Marian Moser Jones & Ronald Bayer, Paternalism & Its
Discontents: Motorcycle Helmet Laws, Libertarian Values, and Public Health,
97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 208 (2007). Curiously, the repeal of “paternal”
motorcycle helmet laws occurred at the same time all U.S. states except New
Hampshire passed mandatory seatbelt laws.
56
Id. at 210-11. See American Motorcycle Association v. Department of
State Police, 11 Mich. App. 351 (1968). The state of Michigan argued for
universal helmet laws on the grounds they wanted to keep citizens healthy and
able to support themselves. However, the appeals court ruled the helmet policy
could lead to undue paternalism.
57
Jones & Bayer, supra note 55, at 211. See Simon v. Sargent, 346 F.
Supp. 277 (1972). In this case, a Massachusetts court ruled that universal
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paternalistic laws can be reduced to issues of the extent to which
the consumer is possessed of attributes that sharply distinguish
him or her from a child. Surely, adults are resistant to the
suggestion that they may be less than skilled consumers than
children, but that resistance may be more wishful wishful
thinking than evidence-based supposition.
Autonomy and freedom of choice are very strong values in
American society, as Richard Stivers suggests: “In the popular
culture of American television and the movies, the autonomous
individual stands out, whether as the rebel against the system or
as the self-centered consumer of endless products, services, and
other people.” 58 An individual is expected to “create [her] mark on
the world through [her] accomplishments, and to be rewarded for
those accomplishments by happiness.” 59 Under this philosophy,
our triumphs and our failures are our own doings, and we are
expected to make the best of whatever situation life presents.
Economists such as Milton Friedman even apply the
individualist argument to children who are born into families
with poor economic circumstances. He argues that the resources
owned by a particular family should not matter to the growth and
development of a child, as he assumes all parents will raise their
children well and produce uniformly rational adults. 60 Despite
helmet laws were needed to protect society from covering unnecessary medical
expenses of injured motorcyclists, and paying for welfare if the cyclist was
unable to work following a motorcycle accident. After twenty-eight states
repealed helmet laws, motorcycle deaths increased from 3,312 in 1976 to 4,062
in 1977. Jones & Bayer, supra note 55, at 213. Other states repealed helmet
laws in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, however the state legislatures included
provisions requiring helmetless riders to have at least $10,000 worth of
insurance coverage. See David Houston & Lilliard Richardson, Motorcycle
Safety and the Repeal of Universal Helmet Laws 97 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 2063
(2007). It is estimated that for every 100 motorcycle deaths, 37 riders would
have survived if they had been wearing a helmet. See Trout, supra note 53, at
407. Trout defends regulations that protect the public good. He states that
while paternalistic policies are considered to interfere with a person’s will,
when a regulation helps us get closer to our long-term goals, that regulation
should not be considered paternalistic. Id. at 409. Further, Trout states some
legal scholars advocate paternalism, arguing “intervention that is based on
third-party effects is not paternalistic.” Id. at 412.
58
See Richard Stivers, Ethical Individualism and Moral Collectivism in
America, 16 HUMANITAS 56 (2003).
59
See Barry Hoffmaster, What Does Vulnerability Mean?, 36 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 38, 42 (2006).
60
See MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 33 (1980) (“We
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Friedman’s assumptions about parenting, however, we cannot
expect all parents will care for their children in the same way and
provide the same level of education. Many parents are
constrained in terms of resources, including money and time, and
may not be able to devote as much time and energy to their
children as they would like.
Friedman agrees it is not fair that some children have an
advantage over others because their parents are wealthy, but he
further asserts that “unfairness can take many forms.” Children
can inherit property or they can inherent talent, such as “musical
ability, strength, [or] mathematical genius.” 61 Friedman asks why
believe, and with good reason, that parents have more interest in their children
than anyone else and can be relied on to protect them and to assure their
development into responsible adults”). See contra Kubasek et al., supra note 5,
at 90 (Stating that because children are not parented in the same way, they
grow to become different sorts of adults. All of society benefits when children
are raised well and become productive citizens. However, when children are
not nurtured by their parents, they are more likely to engage in destructive
behavior that harms society); Thomas D. Cook & Frank Furstenberg, Jr.,
Explaining Aspects of the Transition to Adulthood in Italy, Sweden, Germany,
and the United States: A Cross-Disciplinary, Case Synthesis Approach, 580
ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 257, 283-4 (2002) (discussing the fact that
young unmarried mothers in American society have a particularly difficult
time juggling work and childcare, as they cannot always depend on their
families for assistance. Daycare arrangements have improved because of
programs such as Head Start, because while businesses want employee
mothers to feel comfortable with their childcare arrangements, they do not
want to pay for those services. While daycare can help children learn social
skill and prepare for school, many “state or local subsidized daycare
programs. . .vary considerably in structure and quality,” which can affect a
child’s growth and development).
61
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 136 (arguing against the idea of “fair
shares for all.” Friedman is too quick to change the terms of the debate from
the fairness of financial inheritance to “inherited personal qualities.” He
reasons that some children have money and some children have talent, and
ultimately this distribution is fair. Friedman argues it would be silly to educate
children who are not musically inclined while not letting children who are
musically inclined receive a musical education); Id. at 136 (further stating,
“Life is not fair. It is tempting to believe that government can rectify what
nature has spawned”); Id. at 137 (ignoring the fact that for many children to
develop their talents, they require monetary resources). See contra Thomas W.
Ogletree, Corporate Capitalism and the Common Good: A Framework for
Addressing the Challenges of a Global Economy, 30 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 79,
97 (2002) (arguing that while markets support freedom for people who have
been able to develop their talents, many people do not have the resources to
support their talents. He further asserts that a society founded on freedom has
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people resent the inheritance of money but not talent, since under
the logic of our individualistic society, children should be able to
make the best of the talents or resources they receive. 62
However, these individualistic ideals also create a fearful
society in which everyone has to act for her or himself. Stivers
argues this is the price to be paid for our emphasis on
individualism:
“No one can tell us what to do, for we are equal. At the
same time, however, we cannot rely on others for
assistance; they are not morally bound to us in a
reciprocal relationship. . .We live in tacit fear of others,
not so much of their potential for physical violence as of
their ability to manipulate us.” 63
In a culture based on individualism, vulnerability is
particularly frightening because it signifies a loss of power and
control. We fear harm as a result of our vulnerability and want to
maintain our power, even in old age. 64 Hoffmaster argues that
an obligation to assure everyone has an opportunity to improve his or her
abilities).
62
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 136.
63
See Stivers, supra note 58, at 59 (arguing that we live in an increasingly
fragmented and depersonalized world in which we lack connections to others.
This lack of connection builds fear because we cannot depend on others, we
can only compete with them for scarce resources. In turn, fear and competition
builds greed). See also Frank Cunningham, Market Economies and Market
Societies, 36 J. SOC. PHIL. 129, 134-5 (2005) (arguing that in a market economy
there is always fear, that companies fear their competitors, and that working
people fear job loss and not being able to afford food and housing); Id. at 135
(“In an economy where one is never sure whether the resources required to
satisfy needs or pursue desired life goals will be forthcoming, or where one
must always fear being done in by the competition, resting easy with what one
has can be risky”); Id. at 137 (suggesting that to rid the market economy of
fear, we would have to guarantee an annual income and health care to all
people. He also states these provisions would decrease greed and consumerism
since people would be able to have more meaningful jobs and lives without the
constant pressure to make money); Id. at 138 (discussing the possibility that
there could be problems with this solution because an economy free of fear
could also be free of competition and undermine the efficiency of the market);
Id. at 139 (discussing that some argue that even without fear, Americans
would still be possessive individualists since we have been conditioned as such.
Cunningham asserts, however, that being a possessive individualist is stressful,
and people have an incentive to change that behavior).
64
See Hoffmaster, supra note 59, at 41.

BrowneArticle(Do Not Delete)

2013

3/11/2013 5:15 PM

Adults as Children in Consumer Protection

205

“. . .individualism seeks and requires self-sufficiency and
insulation from the risks that vulnerability poses. . .Vulnerability
threatens individualism, however, because it is enveloped in
contingency and chance. . . .” 65
In an individualistic society vulnerability must be limited
to children, because if we admitted adults are also vulnerable, we
would call into question our beliefs of personal responsibility and
autonomy; ultimately asking how much control an individual has
over her life’s path. Because we want to assume that we are in
charge of our circumstances, we cannot let ourselves be labeled as
vulnerable.
By the time young people reach adulthood in the United
States, they are expected to have cast off their childhood
vulnerabilities and acquired all the skills they need to survive in
the adult world. Adults are assumed to be independent and able
to accept responsibility for their decisions. In the marketplace,
adult consumers are considered to be rational and independent.
As buyers they are not vulnerable to the influence of advertising,
and can exercise free choice to make the best decisions for
themselves and their families. Such individualistic assumptions
dominate market thinking in the United States, as we will discuss
in the next section.

IV. MARKET ASSUMPTIONS AND ADULTHOOD
If the typical consumer were a child, there would be little
mention of privatization, free enterprise, or deregulation. Markets
work efficiently on behalf of both buyers and sellers, if and only
if, adult status results in competence and reflection onto whoever
ages.
A. Happiness is a Free Market
Scholars who support free markets assume several
characteristics about the nature of buyers and sellers in the
marketplace. These assumptions help free market supporters
promote the free market as an optimal economic system. This
Id. at 42; See also id. at 43 (“Human beings are rational, but human
beings also have bodies, and. . .they are vulnerable. In fact, vulnerability is an
even more basic feature of our human constitution than rationality because,
while all human beings are vulnerable, not all human beings are rational or
even possess the potential to become rational”).
65
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optimality is reliant on highly skilled adults to serve as a
counterweight to the incentive structures of sellers.
1. Markets Distribute Resources Fairly
One of the primary assumptions made by free market
supporters is that the market distributes resources fairly,
depending on how hard an individual works and the value of her
labor. 66 According to this line of thought, workers earn what they
are due. If laborers are not pleased with their wage, they are free
to acquire more training and find a new job where they can make
more money. 67 They make careful calculations, choosing an
occupation most consistent with their life goals and abilities.
Following this logic, people should not be poor because
they have the autonomy to seek their own employment. Milton
Friedman suggests poor individuals simply need to work harder,
and that they should not be entitled to government aid simply
because they are lazy. 68 He argues that the market creates jobs by
responding to demand. When consumers want more of a certain
product, workers will be needed to create that product,
companies will provide higher wages and better conditions for
those workers, and more people will want to work in that
industry.69 Friedman believes that;
See Horace L. Fairlamb, Adam Smith’s Other Hand: A Capitalist
Theory of Exploitation, 22 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 193, 194 (1996). Capitalists
argue that management personnel are paid more because their managerial
services are worth more than the other workers. See id. (“Smith sometimes
treats these occurrences as mere possibilities, although other remarks imply
that these possibilities are as much structural features of capitalism as are the
laws of supply and demand”).
67
See Ogletree, supra note 61, at 85.
68
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 5. Friedman rails against the idea that
individuals do not have full control over their lives. He states, “Emphasis on
the responsibility of the individual for his own fate was replaced by emphasis
on the individual as a pawn buffeted by forces beyond his control. The view
that government’s role is to serve as an umpire to prevent individuals from
coercing one another was replaced by the view that the government’s role is to
serve as a parent charged with the duty of coercing some to aid others.” Id. He
further argues, “Most of the present welfare programs should never have been
enacted. If they had not been, many of the people now dependent on them
would have become self-reliant individuals instead of wards of the state.” Id.
at 119.
69
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 15. See also Fairlamb, supra note 66,
at 193 (“According to the free market model, players in the market are
66
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“Wherever the free market has been permitted to operate,
whenever anything approaching equality of opportunity has
existed, the ordinary man has been able to attain levels of living
never dreamed of before. Nowhere is the gap between rich and
poor wider. . .than in those societies that do not permit the free
market to operate.” 70
2. Markets are Automatic
Furthermore, Friedman argues that a free-market system

rewarded according to the efficiency of their performance at serving the
ultimate aim of the market: meeting society’s needs as efficiently—that is, at as
low a price—as possible”).
70
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 146. Scholars debate Friedman’s
assertion that the market is a tool for economic equality, pointing to growing
economic disparities within the United States. See contra Cook and
Furstenberg, supra note 60, at 280. When compared with Sweden, Italy, and
Germany, the United States has the most variability in the quality of the
transition to adulthood. This phenomenon is due to the American emphasis on
individualism and reliance on the market system instead of any formal means
of social support. In the United States, students must work or get loans to pay
for college if their parents cannot, and there is no formal collaboration between
the state and businesses to help train young people for jobs. As such, it may be
difficult for young people from low-income families to be able to afford a
college education that would lead to a higher-paying job. Cook and
Furstenberg suggest that while people of color in many countries have
problems transitioning to adulthood, the problems seem most serious for racial
minorities in the United States who tend to have lower incomes. See contra
Jack Otis, Eileen Mayers Pasztor, & Emily Jean McFadden, Child Labor: A
Forgotten Focus for Child Welfare, 80 CHILD WELFARE 611, 612-14 (2001).
Migrant farm workers also experience cyclical poverty in the United States, as
they labor for low pay under harsh conditions. Often children work beside
their parents to help their families survive, and only one in ten migrant worker
children graduate high school. With this lack of education, it is difficult for
these young adults to find other work and help their families escape the fields.
See contra Ogletree, supra note 61, at 88. Ogletree argues there is a market
incentive to exploit vulnerable workers who need jobs by giving them low
wages, no guarantee of job security, and no health care. See contra Edwin M.
Epstein, The Continuing Quest for Accountable, Ethical, and Humane
Corporate Capitalism: An Enduring Challenge for Social Issues in
Management in the New Millennium, 10 BUS. ETHICS Q. 145, 151-52 (2000)
(“Within many of our business organizations today, the differential in
compensation between the top leadership and the rank and file had increased
significantly during the past decade. More generally, the income and wealth
gap between the top 10 percent of U.S. citizens and the remainder of the nation
continues to widen”).
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is the optimally efficient means of providing customers with the
products they want and for the prices they are willing to pay. In
this system, the buyer and the seller have to find a price that is
agreeable to both of them. According to Adam Smith, who is
considered to be the father of free market philosophy, products on
the market would find a “natural price,” which he defined as the
average price of bringing the product to the market. 71 Further,
because sellers must please consumers if they wish to remain in
business, Friedman asserts that products that do not satisfy the
consumer will not continue to exist. 72
This automaticity assumption is best understood by
contrasting it with its opposite: a market that is controlled by
specific stakeholders for their personal benefit. Here, some group
of people is imposing its will on those who must buy its products.
Examples of decidedly non-automatic markets are the markets
for ice and milk during the aftermath of a hurricane. Anyone
controlling the supply of those commodities in such a scenario
could charge a price significantly above what the market would
normally dictate. It should be noted that defenders of market
decision-making see such a premium price and its resulting flow
of profits as not only a just reward for the thoughtfulness of the
people who controlled the price, but also as a signal to others
about the promise of greed for coordinating resource allocation.
Free market supporters also assume that business owners
will divulge the needs of the consumer and the prices they are
willing to pay for a product, so producers will be naturally
concerned with making the consumer happy and garnering
repeat business.
3. Markets Capitalize on Natural Greed
Horace Fairlamb states that in proposing the free market
system, Adam Smith wanted to suggest that commerce was not
morally flawed, since individual and collective interests could be
combined in the free market. The system would use the sense of
self-interest that is inherent in humans to find a price agreeable to
both the consumer and the producer. 73 Consumers want to pay
the lowest price possible and sellers want to reap the highest

71
72
73

See Fairlamb, supra note 66, at 197.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 202-303.
See Fairlamb, supra note 66, at 195.
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profits possible, so they will naturally find a point that is
satisfactory to both parties. Free market supporters suggest
markets are a sensible reaction to our natural selfishness, coaxing
cooperation from self-centeredness. 74
4. Individuals are Rational
Free market supporters assume that individuals are
rational, meaning that an individual can consider several options
and the costs and benefits of those options, then make the best
decision for their situation. Market thinking assumes consumers
have all the information they need about the price of a product
and its alternatives, the benefits and the drawbacks of the
products, and their wants and needs as consumers. 75 Free market
74
Yet many scholars argue that Smith’s thoughts on self-love and selfcenteredness have been misinterpreted by economists and overemphasized in
promoting the free market system. See David F. Carrithers & Dean Peterson,
Conflicting Views of Markets and Economic Justice: Implications for Student
Learning, 69 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 381-2 (2006). Carrithers and Peterson argue
that economists excerpt sections from Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations and distort the meaning of Smith’s thoughts.
See id. at 382 (“[E]conomists implicitly champion an ethical position that
equates narrow self-interest with good behavior. . .we end up teaching
students that their only duty to society is to be narrowly self-interested, profit
maximizing, shareholder wealth maximizers.”) See also Harvey S. James, Jr. &
Farhad Rassekh, Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society 10
BUS. ETHICS Q. 659, 661 (2000). James and Rassekh state that textbook
authors interpret Smith’s thoughts as “The idea is that nothing more than the
pursuit of one’s self-interest, with self-interest defined in narrowly egoistic
terms, is necessary for a market economy to function well, since an invisible
hand will guide such actions so as to produce positive effects for society.” Id. at
664. James and Rassekh argue that “. . .in Smith’s mind there is a sharp
distinction between selfishness and self-interest” and Smith believed
individuals had to control their tendency to selfishness in a successful society,
and consider the welfare of others as well as themselves. Id.
75
See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 212-13 (citing Thomas S. Ulen,
Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L.
REV. 385, 385-86 (1989)) (arguing the rational choice model requires that
decision makers “know, or can know, all the feasible alternative actions open
to them, that they know, or can easily discover, all relevant prices, and that
they know their wants and desires.”) See M. Joseph Sirgy & Chenting Su, The
Ethics of Consumer Sovereignty in an Age of High Tech, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 1
(2000). Sirgy and Su argue that in a market based on technologically advanced
products, consumer sovereignty is a fiction. Consumers cannot be sure they
are choosing the highest quality product for the lowest price, although this
might have been possible when products were simpler. Id. at 2. The authors
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supporters also “[assume] that whatever a person prefers is
automatically best for that particular person.” 76
Further, market supporters assume that because
consumers are rational, outside forces such as advertising and
marketing do not affect consumer autonomy by making them
want things they would not want otherwise. 77 As Anne
Sirgy and Su further state that in the high-tech economy, consumers do not
have access to the technical information they need about products, and even if
they did it would be difficult for them to process information about quality
way with proper ability or motivation that would aid their decision. Id. at 3.
Further, consumers do not shop around and compare products and cannot
easily inspect different brands in the store because large companies work to
secure shelf space. Because larger companies monopolize this space, consumers
may not be aware of most brands in a product category. Id. at 9.
76
See generally Stephen Jan & Gavin H. Mooney, Childhood Obesity,
Values, and the Market, 1 INT’L. J. PEDIATRIC OBESITY 131 (2006). Jan and
Mooney argue that even if we do not like the choices that an individual
consumer makes, we should not attempt to limit or change her decision
making process: “In practice, it is often observed that markets will allocate in a
manner that some of us find unsavoury – for example inequitable or indeed
unhealthy.” However, “Ultimately markets are about individuals maximizing
their utility by freely exercising their preferences. If they do that in
MacDonald’s [sic] or a health food store, each is okay by the market.” Id. Jan
and Mooney further suggest that consumers who choose to eat unhealthy
things may be doing so rationally, based on cost, taste, convenience. Id. at 132.
77
See Anne Cunningham, Autonomous Consumption: Buying into the
Ideology of Capitalism, 48 J. BUS. ETHICS 229-30 (2003). Yet many other
scholars argue that marketing is a powerful tool for manipulating consumer
desires. See contra Moodie et al., supra note 54, at 136 (Emphasizing the
“constant exposure of individuals to preference manipulation by those
marketing unhealthy products. . .[yet economics] assumes preferences to be
fixed and unchanging.”) Ironically, while marketing draws on psychology and
behavioral research to decide how to influence consumer behavior, economics
assumes equal power between buyers and sellers. Advertisers clearly want
consumers to believe they will be happier if they have a certain car, eat a
certain candy bar, or achieve a certain weight. See contra James Helmer, Love
on a Bun: How McDonald’s Won the Burger Wars, 26 J POPULAR CULTURE 85
(1992). For example, Helmer discusses how, in the 1980’s, McDonald’s
advertising campaign focused on images of families to promote McDonald’s
“as a potential source of love and human happiness—as a place for being a
family.” Id. at 85-86. Helmer argues that Americans “struggle to maintain a
sense of community” and this need for communal loyalty is part of what drives
Americans to consume things. Id. at 86. McDonald’s focused on promoting a
sense of community in its advertising, suggesting the restaurant could hold
family, friends, and generations together. See contra Joseph M. Farrell, The
Ethical Implications of Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising, 23
PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 20 (2003) (arguing that marketing is meant to create
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Cunningham states, while advertising can shape beliefs, it does
not create “discordant [beliefs] that violate one’s autonomy.
Advertising does condition us to purchase but it does not
condition us to act in ways that we cannot control or rationally
explain.” 78
5. Markets Support Choice
Friedman argues the ability to have and make choices in a
free market is invaluable. While he admits that individuals
sometimes make poor decisions in the market, such as investing
in businesses that are not successful, he asserts those individuals
were knowledgeable about the risks of their choice: “For the most
part, they went in with their eyes open. They knew they were
taking chances.” 79 Friedman emphasizes that people are rational
and responsible for their own well-being, and, through making
the right choices, they can succeed in life no matter where they
began. He states that while chance dictates the resources an
individual has in life initially, it is her choice what she wishes to
do with those resources. 80
desires, but some of these desires can have dangerous consequences. He
emphasizes the potentially harmful nature of advertisements for prescription
medication, especially since some consumers would prefer a cholesterollowering medication to making changes in what they eat. Farrell states that
doctors may selectively tell patients information about medications and
treatment options based on the patient’s ability to make choices among those
options and how effective the options will be. Yet while doctors select
information with the patient’s best interest in mind, drug companies advertise
with the aim of selling their product).
78
See Cunningham, supra note 78, at 234.
79
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 139. Contrary to Friedman’s
assertions, many studies have demonstrated that people are ignorant of risk.
See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 212. Individuals base decisions and calculate
risk based not on scientific research or reliable surveys, but on “data and
scenarios that are readily available to. . .memory or imagination.” Id. at 22021. Eisenberg emphasizes that individuals tend to “give too little weight to
future benefits and costs as compared to present benefits and costs,” and they
tend to underestimate risk, ignore low risks, and overestimate low probability
risks. Id. at 222-23.
80
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 22. Friedman’s support of individual
choice and the free market mirrors mainstream American economic and
political thought. See contra ROBERT A. SOLO, THE POSITIVE STATE 25
(1982). As Robert Solo suggests, in American politics the individual and
personal choice are primary: “. . .the source[s] of all efficiency, all coherent
social energy, all ingenuity, all reason, [are found] in the self-seeking individual
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6. Regulations are Harmful
Because choice is primary, market supporters decry
government regulations as limiting the consumer’s right to make
her own decisions.81 For example, Friedman suggests that
individuals should be able to enter whatever profession they
choose and not be restrained by government policies that require
a license: “Today you are not free to offer your services as a
lawyer, a physician, a dentist, a plumber. . .without first getting a
permit or license from a government official.” 82
operating from a base of private property.” See contra Jiwei Ci, Justice,
Freedom, and the Moral Bounds of Capitalism, 25 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 413
(1999). Countering Friedman, Ci argues that considering choice and freedom
to be moral values is detrimental to society and our cultural beliefs. “Thanks to
the moralization of freedom, market behavior, an exercise of freedom. . .is
actually morally affirmed. It is morally good to gain profit.” Because the profit
motive is viewed in a positive light, “. . .individual interests, whether selfregarding or other-regarding, enjoy full ethical (not just legal) legitimacy as
long as they are pursued within the rules of a rather limited notion of justice
that is more or less identical with the rule of law.” Id. at 415.
81
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 66. Friedman states freedom of choice
should be one of our primary values, and further decries any limit placed on
choice in the market: “We are not free to buy an automobile without seatbelts,
though, for the time being, we are still free to choose whether or not to buckle
up.” Id. At times it seems Friedman values individual choice more than safety
considerations. Certainly he would argue that if an individual chooses not to
wear a seatbelt that is her decision, yet others would counter that if that
individual is involved in an auto accident, society will bear part of the burden
for her medical care. See contra Farrell, supra note 77. Counter to Friedman,
Farrell argues that some paternalism is necessary. He states that some people
argue not giving consumers drug information through advertisements leads to
a paternalistic doctor-patient relationship, while learning information about
prescription drugs allows patients to be autonomous and better describe their
symptoms to their physicians. Farrell asserts, however, that some drugs can be
dangerous if not taken properly, and doctors have training and understanding
that the rest of us do not, which is why we must relinquish some control to
them. Id. at 21.
82
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 66. Friedman does not seem to
consider the role of proper training to professional licensing practices. He
implies the government is simply thwarting free choice and has no practical
concerns, and that current doctors and plumbers are not concerned about
consumer harm, but selfishly want to control the number of individuals who
can enter the profession. Id. at 240. Yet Robert Solo suggests that even though
economists constantly decry government and the limits it places on freedom of
choice, the state is a necessary power because there is much the market cannot
do. See contra SOLO, supra note 80, at 12. Solo argues that economists have to
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Additionally, free market supporters believe that
businesses should not be regulated since concentrations of market
power such as monopolies will not last. They assume new
companies will enter the market and provide better products at a
lower cost thereby breaking the monopoly. Market supporters
also assert any decisions made by regulators will result in worse
problems than those they are trying to regulate. 83
B. Errors Limiting Adults in the Market: Invisible Hand or
Visible Fist?
Many scholars have explained systemic errors in the
determination of market prices and consequent consumer
decisions, which along with common cognitive errors, inhibit the
ability of actual adults to imitate the conceptual adults envisioned
in defenses of the self-regulating market.
1. Adam Smith: Lost in Translation?
Some economists suggest that the writings of Adam Smith
have been read selectively with the intent of promoting the free
market system, while in fact Smith had many ethical concerns
about the workings of the free market. 84 Bassiry and Jones argue
Smith was especially worried about monopolies and the
concentration of economic resources. He was also concerned that
economic power could translate into political power, and that
businesses might become influential in proposing legislation.
Smith envisioned a free market based on small producers in
which no individual or company would be able to set prices,
keep resetting the boundary lines over which the state can cross, as the
limitations of the market system become steadily apparent. Id. at 13. For
instance, inept doctors could be weeded out of the market system because they
will provide poor care and lose patients, but do we want to risk patient harm
by abandoning the licensing process and allowing the market to take over?
83
See contra Irwin M. Stelzer, A Conservative Case for Regulation, PUB.
INT. 85, 86 (1997). Stelzer suggests not all markets are equal, and some are not
competitive enough to produce fair results. He argues conservatives should
accept some regulations to prevent more direct government involvement.
Stelzer adds that a limited number of regulations can also promote support for
capitalism, as consumers want to assure power is distributed fairly and small
business owners can enter the market. Id. at 87.
84
See G.R. Bassiry & Marc Jones, Adam Smith and the Ethics of
Contemporary Capitalism, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 621, 621-22 (1993). See also
James, supra note 77, at 659.

BrowneArticle(Do Not Delete)

3/11/2013 5:15 PM

Loyola Consumer Law Review

214

Vol. 25:2/3

which is not the same as our current capitalist system. 85
James and Rassekh further argue that scholars must study
Smith’s book The Theory of Moral Sentiments to understand his
more well-known text, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations. If one does not read both of these books, it
is easy to misinterpret Smith’s ideas on social systems. James and
Rassekh assert that Smith does not “[consider] self-interest to be
synonymous with selfishness and thus devoid of ethical
considerations,” as some have interpreted his philosophy to
mean. 86 Instead, the authors emphasize Smith’s ethic included
concern for others and their interests, as Smith “. . .maintains that
we are also endowed with the capacity to exercise self-command
to contain our passions when the pursuit of self-love injures other
people.” 87
2. Monopoly Money
Smith believed monopolies were natural but temporary,
because market forces would lower the price of goods to “natural”
levels. This assumption has present bearing here because the
progenitors of an unfettered capitalism realize that even a
thoughtful adult consumer is not able to bargain effectively with
representatives of large concentrated firms. However, the
existence of Smith’s “natural” prices is dependent on monopolies
being temporary. Additionally, Smith did not elaborate on how
monopolies might negatively affect labor. 88 Smith realized
business owners would have a power advantage over workers
and could lower wages below the “natural” level, but he did not
press the idea further, only implying monopolies might cause
labor to be exploited. 89 These workers are the same persons who,
in a different role, are supposed to be the power equals of
corporate sellers.

See Bassiry, supra note 84, at 623. See also Ogletree, supra note 61, at
96. Ogletree argues business and politics have merged too closely and created
distortions in both the political and the market system. He asserts “personal or
corporate wealth is employed to promote narrow special interests over against
the interests of others, as though some ‘invisible hand’ would assure a
mutually satisfactory outcome.” Id.
86
James, supra note 77, at 659.
87
Id. at 663.
88
See Fairlamb, supra note 66, at 201, 214.
89
Id. at 207, 210.
85
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True to Smith’s predictions, Horace Fairlamb argues that
monopolies and power concentrations in the free market promote
the emergence of a second invisible hand “where systematic
advantages accrue to those who are already positioned with
power, whether through nature, institutions, or wealth.” 90 As
power concentrates among a few businesses, the autonomous
consumer loses her power to gain product information from
businesses and make educated choices.
3. Unequal Distribution of Resources
While market supporters argue that individuals in a free
market are given what they deserve as a result of their work, this
division is far from equal. This inequality is relevant to the
distinction between child and adult in that consumer interests are
advanced in large part by ability to pay. Anything that reduces
the likelihood that most consumers will have the economic
resources required for showing muscle in market negotiations
See Fairlamb, supra note 66, at 212. Many argue that in our market
economy, economic power has concentrated among relatively few businesses.
As a result, small businesses are shut out of the market, and consumers can be
forced to pay unfairly high prices for goods and services. See Sirgy & Su, supra
note 76. Sirgy and Su argue that in a high-tech world, competition will falter
since small businesses with superior products will not have the resources to
compete with large businesses. Larger firms are able to devote more resources
to creating innovative products, and stores prefer to work with large
companies to maximize their sales. See Ronald Paul Hill, Stalking the Poverty
Consumer: A Retrospective Examination of Modern Ethical Dilemmas, 37 J.
BUS. ETHICS 202, 209 (2002). Hill states that businesses have a distinct
advantage in poor communities since sources of income and available goods
are few. Id. at 209. The poor are often victims of price inflation, as costs for
items in a poor neighborhood are about 41% higher than those items in an
affluent neighborhood. Id. at 214. Additionally, businesses take advantage of
the poor through high-interest credit arrangements such as rent-to-own
agreements, because individuals must either accept these conditions or go
without. Id. at 215. See contra C.W. DeMarco, Knee Deep in Technique: The
Ethics of Monopoly Capital, 31 J. BUS. ETHICS 151 (2001). DeMarco suggests
monopolies should not be regarded as inherently bad. While neoclassical
economic theory tells us that competition is good and monopolies are not,
DeMarco argues we cannot assume that just because there is competition,
there is economic justice. He readily admits monopolies should be closely
monitored as they can lead to price fixing, price discrimination, and collusion,
ultimately harming consumers. Yet he also suggests there are some occasions
when monopolies might be achieved fairly, and be more beneficial or efficient
than competitive structures. Id.
90
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thereby increases the vulnerability of consumers.
Milton Friedman’s concept of equality is negative equality
or equity, defined as equality before the law. 91 Under a system of
equity, people’s votes and pennies are worth the same amount,
but some people may have more pennies or votes than others. 92
Equity allows individuals to keep what they have, based on the
assumption that they have gained it fairly. According to this
assumption that individuals can keep what they have, even if it is
more than that resources of others, individuals have no obligation
to pay for public services, health care, unemployment, or other
social safety nets for others who may experience economic
problems. 93
Conversely, Martin Hollis argues for the idea of positive
equality or “egality,” suggesting that people are “equal only if we
have the same full, participating share in the costs and benefits of
the social enterprise.” 94 Hollis argues that because the market
does not distribute resources equally, societies need to devise a
minimum standard for redistribution of wealth that will allow
people to be comfortable while they are free to “[live] life in their
own way.” 95 Many suggest that a system of egality would also

91
See Martin Hollis, Market Equality and Social Freedom, 7 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 15, 16 (1990).
92
See Hollis, supra note 91, at 20. (“Egalitarians argue for equality of
power, if there is to be equal freedom of choice. Equity does not involve
equality of power”). See Hill, supra note 90, at 211 (citing data from the 2000
U.S. Census, which found 12% of people in the U.S. were impoverished,
including 10% of elderly and 17% of children. Further, slightly less than 25%
of African-American and Hispanic people were living below the poverty line,
but a surprising 74 % of the poor were employed).
93
See Charles Maechling, Jr., The Next Century: Can the Free Market
Panacea Survive?, 71 VA. Q. REV. 1 (1995) Maechling emphasizes that
countries such as Japan and Germany have successful mixed state and free
market economies, because the national governments believe the state has a
duty to secure the well-being of its population. The free market alone cannot
guarantee the well-being for all people in a given country. Because the free
market system is based on individual good, it also poses dangers through
commodification of natural resources on a global scale. See David Bollier,
Why We Must Talk About the Information Commons, 96 Law Libr. J. 267
(2004). There is no global authority to assure for the well-being of poor nations,
so their citizens risk losing access to natural resources such as water if they
cannot pay for them. A lack of clean water could parch poor nations and even
lead to loss of life due to unequal distribution.
94
See Hollis, supra note 91, at 17.
95
Id. at 20.
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benefit society as a whole, as an increase in economic equality
would lead to a decrease in crime. 96 If individuals are provided
with the means to meet basic needs, the temptation to steal or
otherwise gain property by illegal means decreases.
4. Asymmetric Information: What You Don’t Know Can
Hurt You
In the free market it is important for buyers to have
information about their product choices so they can make the best
possible purchasing decisions. However, sellers have more
information about their products than buyers, and even when
buyers do have information, they are prone to misuse it. The
profit motive can encourage business owners to withhold
information or lie outright. 97 It can be valuable for companies to
be the sole possessor of that knowledge since they can make more
money if they only give the consumer partial information. 98 For
example, Joel Davis argues marketers sometimes bend scientific

The emphasis on materialism in the United States combined with an
unequal distribution of income arguably leads to a higher crime rate. See Cook
and Furstenberg, supra note 60, at 284. Even though young people in the
United States have less social support and access to good jobs than young
people in other countries, they are expected to consume many goods. These
young people need money to purchase goods, and so some of them resort to
crime and are eventually incarcerated. Because many of these young people
are men, their families lose a source of income, and the young men themselves
lose time when they could be developing work and social skills. Some have
argued that assuring individuals a fair minimum income would lead to an
increase in crime and sloth, but others suggest the crime level would decrease.
See Doris Schroeder, Wickedness, Idleness, and Basic Income, 7 RES PUBLICA
1 (2001). Schroeder argues that studies have connected unemployment and
crime, but that is different than connecting idleness and crime. Schroeder
further suggests that if material inequality leads to crime, guaranteeing a basic
income might decrease crime.
97
See William Keep, Adam Smith’s Imperfect Invisible Hand:
Motivations to Mislead, 12 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 343 (2003). Keep argues
that dishonest businesses encourage consumers to be dishonest, since
businesses committing fraud against consumers lead consumers to commit
fraud against businesses. See also David C. Colander, MICROECONOMICS 38,
417-19 (5th ed. 2004).
98
See Keep, supra note 97, at 345. Companies have an incentive to keep
information private if revealing the information would harm profits.
Businesses have a further incentive not to do a lot of research on product
safety, since such research can be expensive. Id. at 347.
96
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information to make products more attractive to consumers. 99 An
advertisement may claim that a garbage bag is biodegradable,
which may be technically true, though the bag will take a long
time to biodegrade in the landfill where it will most likely end
up.100 Additionally, studies have demonstrated that consumers
make purchases based partly on their emotional responses to a
product, and sellers can either lie or provide partial information
about a product to take advantage of those emotions. 101
Joel J. Davis, Riskier Than We Think? The Relationship Between Risk
Statement Completeness and Perceptions of Direct to Consumer Advertised
Prescription Drugs, 5 J. HEALTH COMM’N 349, (2000). For example, in the
market for direct to consumer (DTC) prescription drug advertising, research
was conducted to assess the extent to which DTC prescription drug
advertising provides consumers with the information they need to make an
informed evaluation of an advertised drug’s relative benefits and risks. In the
case of this research into prescription drug advertising, the results show that
the benefits of the drugs are overstated in a way that makes drugs appear to be
safer than they actually in the mind of the consumer because of the number
and types of side effects included in their risk statement. Id. at 366.
100
See Joel Davis, Ethics and Environmental Marketing, 11 J. BUS.
ETHICS 81, 81-82 (1992). Davis argues regulations that are supposed to protect
consumers from deceptive practices are often ineffectual or disregarded by
companies. Even though the Federal Trade Commission “[prohibits]
advertising or packaging claims which are untrue, misleading, deceptive, or
fraudulent, including claims that, although literally true, mislead by omitting
or obscuring facts necessary for the public to properly interpret the
claims. . .marketers have a history of pushing regulatory guidelines to their
limits, relying on scientific truths to substantiate their claims and ignoring the
manner in which the typical consumer will interpret the claim.” Id. at 84.
101
See Keep, supra note 97, at 347. Keep argues that emotion is very
important to economic decision making, as individuals and business make
purchases based on “non-economic motivations ranging from sentiment and
nostalgia. . .to the need for personal control.” As a result of the influence of
emotion, sellers can affect consumer behavior by “. . .attaching emotional
responses to preferred outcomes.” See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1993). Psychologist Robert
Cialdini suggests that advertisers, salespeople, and other individuals we
interact with in daily life can affect how we make decisions by purposefully or
unwittingly causing a reaction in our normal thought processes. Cialdini
explains that certain ideas or events garner an almost instinctual reaction in
both people and animals. He calls this reaction “click-whirr,” comparing it to
an audio-tape that is set to play after a certain event happens. Individuals can
use this knowledge about reactions to cause other people to act in certain ways.
Cialdini writes, “Although there are thousands of different tactics that
compliance practitioners employ to produce yes, the majority fall within six
basic categories. . .consistency, reciprocation, social proof, authority, liking,
and scarcity,” Id. at xiii.
99
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Some people might suggest that with all of the information
consumers are given through advertisements, they should be able
to make rational choices. Others argue consumers are overloaded
by so much information it can be confusing and misleading.102
Richard Beltramini suggests that drug advertisements provide so
much information that they mystify rather than inform: “It is easy
to envision how consumers can potentially let down their guards,
and based on the perceived scientific precision of an abundance
of charts and graphs included, assume a far less skeptical
orientation toward such information-rich advertising.” 103
Beltramini adds that elderly, sick, or economically disadvantaged
people are especially vulnerable to drug company claims, as they
“want to believe these products will solve their problems, [and]
oftentimes assume the veracity of the scientific information
provided.” 104

See Robert E. Lane, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 138,139-45 (1991). In
his book, Lane provides evidence that reveals cognitive complexity “matches
environmental complexity to higher and higher points, and then, when the
environment becomes too complex, ‘stress’ or ‘trauma’ reduces cognition to
simpler levels—perhaps even below the starting points.” See David Glen Mick,
Susan Broniarczyk, & Jonathan Haidt, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose,
Choose, Choose, Choose: Emerging Research on the Deleterious Effects of
Living in Consumer Hyperchoice, 52 J. BUS. ETHICS 207 (2004). Mick,
Broniarczyk, and Haidt state one of the current problems in the marketplace is
that there are too many options. When the number of products becomes
overwhelming, consumers are less happy and tend to regret their purchasing
decisions, assuming the products they did not choose might have been better
than the one they selected. Id. at 208. Requiring consumers to make many
choices in rapid succession has also been shown to have detrimental effects on
cognition and “[drain] psychological energy, as seen through decrements in
self-regulation and willpower.” See Trout, supra note 53, at 417. Trout
suggests that too many choices paralyze consumers with options, and choosing
poorly makes consumers feel awful. Trout argues consumers assume many
choices should make them happy and expand their ability to choose, but in the
end they only become depressed.
103
See Richard Beltramini, Consumer Believability of Information in
Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) Advertising, 63 J. BUS. ETHICS 333, 334 (2006).
Most consumers cannot meaningfully evaluate drug manufacturer claims
about products, and may “find themselves vulnerable to disingenuous
exaggerations (bordering on outright deception).” Id. at 334.
104
See Beltramini, supra note 103, at 334. Beltramini suggests that a
senior citizen examining an ad for arthritis medication will focus more on the
picture of a healthy old person that accompanies the ad than on warnings and
scientific language about the product: “Although the advertisement is legally
compliant in not explicitly promising such recuperative benefits from this
102
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Further, consumers often cannot wisely interpret product
details. 105 When companies only provide a small amount of
information, consumers tend to put too much emphasis on that
limited knowledge and form an extreme opinion about the
product that is either too positive or negative. 106 If consumers
realize they have limited information they are less inclined to
make extreme judgments, but sometimes only experts can realize
information is missing.107
Also, consumers may end product information searches
too early, believing they have enough information to make a
decision when in fact they are missing important details. 108 While
buyers understand they should consider a number of criteria
when deciding which product to buy, often they do not know
which criteria are most important, and they usually trust those
who provide information about the product to be honest and
accurate. 109
product, the normally skeptical reader’s proportionate attention to the wishful
results illustrated, actually enhances his believability of the ad’s implied
performance claims.” Id. at 335.
105
See George Katona & Eva Mueller, A Study of Purchase Decisions,
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1954). In their study of household appliance
purchasing decisions, Katona and Mueller discovered that most buyers did not
spend a long time planning for the purchase, looking for information about
different products, or visiting different stores to compare models.
106
See David M. Sanbonmatsu, Frank R. Kardes, David C. Houghton,
Edward A. Ho, Overestimating the Importance of the Given Information in
Multiattribute Consumer Judgments, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 289, 296
(2003).
107
Id. at 291.
108
Id. at 298. Sanbonmatsu and his colleagues conducted a study in which
they presented participants with certain automobile characteristics and asked
the participants to explain whether or not these attributes were important in
their purchasing decisions. Even though participants were given different
attributes, they stated the ones they were given were important considerations
in their decision—gas mileage if gas mileage was described, reliability if
reliability was described. Economic assumptions suggest consumers have a set
of criteria in mind before they make a decision, but this study suggests that the
information given to consumers affects their decision if they are not experts on
the subject. Id. at 297. See Colander supra note 97 at 200. Galbraith suggests
that companies have the power to direct consumer decisions, yet few other
economists share this perspective as they assume consumers have preferences
that do not change and cannot be altered by outside influences. See also
generally Gary Becker and George Stigler, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,
EVERYTHING FOR SALE (1999).
109
Id. at 297.
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Consumers must trust that companies are producing safe
products, but this trust is often in jeopardy because consumers
realize businesses do not always provide all the required product
information. 110 Franck Meijboom and colleagues state that
economists assume buyers and sellers are “rational agents and
that trust is a form of rational calculation in which both the
trustor and the trustee aim to maximize their interests.” 111 Yet the
process of trust is not always rational, because consumers can
interpret the same information in different ways. A product recall
may assure one consumer that the company is being diligent, but
make another consumer worried because the company initially
manufactured a defective product. 112
5. Rationality: When Logic Escapes Us
Classical economics assumes that humans are selfish and
rational, however this is not always the case. 113 For instance,
110
See Franck Meijboom, Tatjana Visak, Frans Brom, From Trust to
Trustworthiness: Why Information is not Enough in the Food Sector, 19 J.
AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 427, 427-28 (2006). Meijboom and his colleagues
argue that trust is crucial to a successful economy. Consumers have to “depend
on the expertise of others, the checks and balances within the supply chain,
and first and foremost on the goodwill of anonymous people. . .” The global
food market has left consumers feeling a loss of control because they do not
know how or where their food is produced, and they fear tainted food. See
Keep, supra note 97, at 349 (arguing that trust is necessary to markets so that
producers and consumers can have long-lasting relationships, while lies and
deceptive practices “[break] important social threads by increasing uncertainty
and unreliability”).
111
See Meijboom, supra note 110, at 429.
112
Id.; See also id. at 430 (“This does not entail that trust is an intangible
concept that lacks any relation to reflective deliberation and reason, yet it
shows that dealing with trust cannot be reduced to providing information or
decreasing risk levels”).
113
See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 214. Because of limits on time, money,
and the inability of the human mind to process a lot of information,
individuals do not look for the best solutions as suggest by economic models,
but merely solutions that will work. Id. at 214. Eisenberg emphasizes that
individuals “will not process information perfectly even if they wish to do so,
because human ability to calculate consequences, understand implications, and
make comparative judgments on complex alternatives is limited.” Id. at 216.
Eisenberg further states that individuals “often fail to make rational decisions
even within the bounds of the information they have acquired,” in part
because they tend to be “unrealistically optimistic,” believing, for example, that
they can drive well enough to avoid accidents, and that their homes have an
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consumers do not consider all of their product alternatives and
then rationally decide which product to buy; they tend to examine
one product and disregard the benefits and drawbacks of other
products. 114 Even if brands are very similar, consumers may
favor one brand if they have more information about it.
Additionally, customers often gather product information in a
way that supports their original ideas about the product and
leads them to be even more certain of their beliefs. 115
Consumers also have problems interpreting the value of
product information, and tend to think any new product
information will be important in their decision, regardless of
whether that information should factor in the choice. Putting
weight on new information rationalizes finding the information in
the first place, but results in consumers considering factors that
should not be included in the decision-making process. 116
average or below average risk of damage. Id. at 216. See Jonah Lehrer, Driven
to Market 443 NATURE, 502 (2006). Neuroeconomics uses experimental
techniques in neuroscience to investigate how the brain makes economic
decisions. Through neuroeconomics scientists have devised the dual process
model, which suggests the brain is capable of logic and irrational emotion, and
emotion tends to trump logic. Other scientists disagree with this theory, but
neuroeconomists claim they have triumphed regardless because they can
explain consumer actions while economists cannot. Scientists have also
discovered the areas of the brain that control emotions are associated with
immediate gratification, while areas of the brain that control logic are
associated with delayed gratification. Some researchers hypothesize emotions
were useful in the distant past to help humans make decisions, but now we
need to devise ways to control those emotional biases since they can affect our
judgment. Id. at 504.
114
See Frank Kardes, David M. Sanbonmatsu, Maria Cronley, David
Houghton, Consideration Set Overvaluation: When Impossibly Favorable
Ratings of a Set of Brands are Observed, 12 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 353
(2002). See also Ralph I. Allison & Kenneth P. Uhl, Impact of Beer Brand
Identification on Taste Perception, 1 J. OF MARKETING RES. 36 (1964). After
conducting a blind taste-test among men who drank beer at least three times a
week, Allison and Uhl found that participants could not tell the difference
among five kinds of beer. Id.
115
See Kardes et al., supra note 114, at 354.
116
See Anthony Bastardi & Eldar Shafir, Nonconsequential Reasoning
and Its Consequences 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 216, 217-18
(2000) (“People. . .are often unaware of pursuing noninstrumental information.
Instead, they misconstrue such pursuit as an indication that the information is
likely to prove instrumental”). See David L. Schwartzkopf, The Effects of
Attraction on Investment Decisions, 4 J. BEHAV. FIN. 96, 97 (2003). If
preferences are stable, then introducing a third product into a set of two should
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6. Emotional Decisions
Also, consumers often have emotional reasons to make
purchases, including tradition, social trends, and belonging in
certain social groups. 117 Buying decisions can also be emotional in
nature because consumers connect their emotions to decisions
they need to make, so “people in a good mood may be more
optimistic, and people in a bad mood more pessimistic,”
regardless of the choice at hand.118 Studies further suggest that a
customer’s mood can affect what she thinks about a product. 119
She may have a better opinion about the good in question when
she is happy and a worse opinion when she is sad, 120 contradicting
economists’ assumptions regarding a rational consumer with
fixed and unchanging preferences.
John Nofsinger argues that the economy has a strong
emotional component because it is composed of many human
interactions. While economists argue that individuals rationally
consider the consequences of many options before they make a
decision, Nofsinger states that individuals considering these
many consequences “[anticipate] the emotions of experiencing
those outcomes.” 121 People can spread emotion through
not affect what a consumer thinks about the first two products. However, if
the consumer weighs two products, A and B, equally, but notices that product
A is better in some respect than product C, she will tend to prefer product A.
Product C gives her a reason to prefer product A because she changes how
much weight she places on a characteristic product A has that product C lacks.
Id. at 98. This study suggests consumer preferences can shift relatively easily.
117
See Keep, supra note 97, at 347.
118
See John Nofsinger, Social Mood and Financial Economies, 6 J.
BEHAV. FIN. 144, 146 (2005). People often make decisions based on “subtle
feelings” they may not realize they are experiencing. “Using [this] affective
impression to make decisions can be easier than weighing the pros, cons, and
outcome probabilities. This is especially true when the decision is complex.”
Id.
119
Id.
120
See Georgios A. Bakamitsos & George J. Siomkos, Context Effects in
Marketing Practice: The Case of Mood, 3 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 304, 307
(2004). Because of mood, “different types of advertisements may evoke
different types of processing by consumers and may have different effects on
consumers’ attitudes towards the advertised product/service.” Id. at 306.
121
Id. at 145. See id. at 146 (“At times, emotional reactions diverge from
cognitive evaluations and dominate the decision process. . .The greater the
complexity and uncertainty of a situation, the more emotions influence the
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interactions and change how others act within the economy. For
example, if society is optimistic, investors and company
executives may also be optimistic, leading more people to buy
stock and underestimate risk. 122
7. Cognitive Biases
Human beings are also subject to several different biases
and emotional responses that prevent us from acting
“rationally.” 123 For example, the availability bias describes an
individual’s propensity to decide how probable an event is based
on how easy it is to recall. 124 The overconfidence bias suggests
individuals are more certain of the correctness of their decisions
than is merited. 125 The hindsight bias refers to an individual’s
decision”).
122
See Nofsinger, supra note 119, at 144. Nofsinger suggests that while
optimism can help the economy, overconfidence can cause a stock market
bubble and lead to overinvestment. He also argues social mood affects how we
feel about businesses—we like CEO’s when the social mood is high, we call
them devils when the social mood is low. Id. at 147.
123
See generally Trout, supra note 53. See generally Eisenberg, supra note
47. See Andrew Colman, Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and
Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction, 26 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 139,
140 (2003). Coleman argues that rationality is far more complex than behaving
reasonably and logically. Individuals often use bounded rationality, employing
“rules of thumb” when making decisions. While these simple rules lead to
errors, they also allow individuals to solve problems quickly. See Pat Barclay
and Martin Daly, Humans Should be Individualistic and Utility-Maximizing,
but Not Necessarily Rational, 26 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 154 (2003). Barclay
and Daly argue that individuals should not always be expected to make
choices that would seem the most logical and rational. Individuals’ decisions
are often affected by “incomplete information, errors, concern for the welfare
of others (such as friends or relatives), or manipulation by others.” Id.
124
See Trout, supra note 53, at 399-400. If an event is surprising,
individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood of such an event happening
again. Trout suggests the availability bias can move attention to
sensationalized issues and away from more pragmatic and pressing ones.
125
Id. at 400. Trout suggests this bias is especially relevant when
considering an individual’s confidence in her financial decisions. See Janet
Metcalfe, Cognitive Optimism: Self-Deception or Memory-Based Processing
Heuristics?, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 100 (1998). Individuals
tend to overestimate how well they performed or will perform on cognitive
tasks. People believe they will be able to solve problems when they won’t,
think they are going finding the right answer right before they make a mistake,
believe they know answers when they do not, and think they understand new
information when they have not mastered the concepts. Studies suggest this
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tendency to overestimate how likely she thought something was
to happen after the event has occurred. 126
The framing bias suggests that individuals often base their
decisions on the way problems are presented, as opposed to
focusing solely on the details of the problem. 127 The status quo
bias describes an individual’s preference to remain in her present
condition as opposed to making changes, even if the changes may
be positive. 128 Finally, the anchoring and adjustment bias
suggests consumers may use unimportant information as a
reference point for making a decision, such as basing an offer for
a good on an initial asking price instead of doing research to see
what a good is worth. 129 These biases contribute to consumer
misuse of information in a self-regulating market.
8. Defining the Role of Government: More or Less?
J.D. Trout argues that cognitive biases are so pervasive
that they threaten individuals’ long-term goals. He states that
even when the government requires sellers to provide certain
information to consumers to help them make rational decisions,
the information is generally not helpful because consumers
cannot make sense of it. 130 Trout suggests the problem of
cognitive biases merits government intervention to help
individuals make sensible decisions. 131 He argues institutional
decisions made for the common good will be more beneficial than
decisions made by individuals. Further, he claims that such social
policies are not paternalistic when they are made to improve the
bias is due to individuals basing decisions on information they have and how
they feel when they make the decision. Individuals use whatever information
they can recall to make a judgment, regardless of whether that information is
correct.
126
See Trout, supra note 53, at 402 (discussing how individuals tend to
forget how uncertain they were of the probability of an event’s occurrence
before the event happened).
127
Id. at 404.
128
Id. at 405 (discussing how individuals fail to consider the benefits and
drawbacks of their current situation, and instead focus on the drawbacks of
changing their condition).
129
Id. at 406-07.
130
Id. at 394.
131
Id. at 422 (arguing that while we tend to blame individuals for making
bad decisions, we must remember that it is very difficult for humans to defy
their cognitive biases because these biases are biological and enforced by
habit).
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well-being of the community, not targeting any specific person. 132
Trout asserts cognitive biases are separate from an
individual’s will and can pose a danger to others, so there is no
moral question about instituting policies to counteract cognitive
biases. 133 One such policy he proposes involves the government
painting chevron markers on roads to make lanes seem to be
narrowing so drivers slow down.134 Trout suggests this practice is
merited because it fulfills the driver’s goal of living a longer life,
and defeats the cognitive bias that would harm that goal. 135
Many scholars argue that our society must reexamine its
goals and focus on actions that promote the collective good, since
even as individuals, we cannot act without affecting others.
Robert Solo asserts that the state has an important role to play in
this collective society, yet Americans tend to be wary of state
intervention because the government has performed poorly in the
past. Solo argues this failure is result of the United States
government lacking the proper resources, structure, and
personnel to succeed in its duties. 136 Agencies designated to
oversee government programs are ill-equipped to perform their
tasks, and as a result they are often derided by politicians who are
supposed to support collective activities. 137
Solo further argues that economists have wrongly tried to
interpret government behavior and its duties through market
logic and economic theories of profit and loss, which is an
inappropriate means of measuring government activities. 138 He
See Id. at 412-13 (“The common good calls for the participation of
individuals even if it is not in their individual interests to participate, but
rather in the interests of other people, and in the public interest, to
participate”).
133
Id. at 416.
134
Id. at 426.
135
Id. at 428. Another example of a helpful policy to defeat cognitive
biases would be retirement plans that ask employees if they want to start
saving more in three months. Employees tend to enroll in these delayed plans
because the deduction in their paycheck will not begin for a number of weeks.
Additionally, employees tend to stay in these plans because individuals have a
bias not to change their current conditions.
136
See SOLO, supra note 80, at 63-64.
137
Id. at 81 (“Our agencies (and systems) of collective action, organization,
innovation, and control. . .are in a general state of disarray. . .The state has
extended its activities far beyond the scope for which society is ideologically
prepared”).
138
See SOLO, supra note 80, at 84 (“Given the unfortunate but alas general
proclivity of the expert to deny the reality of that which his theory does not
132
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asserts the government needs its own theory and its own plan to
organize collective energy. 139 Among other ideas, Solo suggests
the government should play a greater role in monitoring the
activities of businesses. 140 Further, the government can assist in
economic development by promoting resources that can be made
accessible to all people, such as an archive that would make
research and development information public. 141 If this data is
easily available, it can be distributed to many people and used to
increase productivity in the market. 142

V. CONCLUSION
A Chinese proverb reminds us that one generation plants
the trees; another generation gets the shade. If we approach
buying and selling as relational activities where the seeds of trust
are sowed by assisting one another in decision making, and are
later harvested by subsequent commercial activity, we can take
advantage of the promise of markets. That promise encourages
diligence, prudential planning, efficiency, and enlarges the arena
where reflective autonomy can guide us. But resistance to such an
attitude of cooperation and honesty among buyers and sellers

explain, and to reason by false analogy from that with which he is familiar to
that with which he is not, the ingrained outlook and accepted doctrines of the
economists have served as a profoundly distorting lens through which the role
and tasks of the positive state are seen and evaluated”).
139
Id. at 87. Solo emphasizes that we cannot “borrow” businesspeople
from Wall Street to run the state, because those individuals will arrive with
ideas that are helpful on Wall Street but not in the positive state. Solo argues
that we must train people with ideas and strategies to help them competently
operate the positive state. Id. at 88.
140
Id. at 89 (arguing that we need to have dual corporate management,
involving both public and private corporation managers). Id. at 100-01
(discussing that public managers would report to Congress on behalf of their
industry).
141
See SOLO, supra note 80, at 129-134. See Bollier, supra note 93. Bollier
argues privatizing information is dangerous, because that information is then
controlled by companies and out of the public domain. Such commodification
is rampant, as corporations are funding university research and deciding who
can have access to the data, a practice that harms the university’s valuable
role in finding and disseminating knowledge. He also argues drug companies
must be stopped from gaining free access to federal research, especially if
corporations use that research to develop drugs and charge high prices to
consumers. Id. at 164.
142
See Bollier, supra note 93.
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creates an atmosphere of distrust that poisons important,
legitimate efforts by businesspeople to meet human wants.
When asked to picture the average adult consumer, do we
see a logical, rational person who has a clear grasp on her
preferences and is aware of the benefits and drawbacks of all her
purchases? Conversely, do we imagine an individual who has
difficulties making the best decision because she does not have
correct information? Should we consider consumers to be
autonomous individuals or vulnerable people who need help to
choose the best goods and services?
As individuals, we answer those questions based on
cultural values, reflection, and observations of a very small
number of consumers. In the United States, while children are
considered vulnerable and in need of protections, adult
consumers are expected to be fully autonomous and able to
independently find the product information they need.
The libertarian response to such a statement is
understandably, “Do not treat adults as infants.” By all means we
should base our legal regulatory regime on the desire to
encourage as much agency and reflective autonomy as the
ontology of our humanity and the structure of our markets permit.
But we can achieve that objective more fully if we refuse to
engage in the wishful thinking that just because we are bigger
and older than those we deem “children,” that we have
necessarily left behind all of the decision-making inadequacies
that we see so clearly in those younger than we are.

